Airbus: fewer than 100 A320s require mandated modifications following Friday’s emergency directive

In an update regarding the mandated emergency software and/or hardware modifications on around 6,000 Airbus A320 family aircraft, the European planemaker has said that fewer than 100 aircraft have to be modified before they can return to service.

On December 1, 2025, Airbus provided an update about the emergency Alert Operators Transmission (AOT), which potentially affected around 6,000 Airbus A320ceo and A320neo family aircraft, stating that the manufacturer has worked with its airline customers “to support the modification of less than 100 remaining aircraft to ensure they can be returned to service.”

Airbus informed its airline customers and the public about the issue on November 28, saying that following analysis of a recent safety event, involving an A320 family aircraft, it concluded that “intense solar radiation may corrupt data critical to the functioning of flight controls.”

The European planemaker had worked proactively with regulators, including the European Union Aviation Safety Agency (EASA), “to request immediate precautionary action from operators via” an AOT to implement “available software and/or hardware protection, and ensure the fleet is safe to fly.”

Shortly after, EASA issued an emergency airworthiness directive (EAD) for all A320ceo and A320neo family aircraft, revealing that the issue affected the elevator aileron computer (ELAC) B L104, with the serviceable – or safe to operate – ELAC being the B L013+.

EASA detailed that an A320 aircraft “recently experienced an uncommanded and limited pitch down event,” and while the autopilot remained on during the incident, the aircraft had experienced “a brief and limited loss of altitude.”

“Preliminary technical assessment done by Airbus identified a malfunction of the affected ELAC as a possible contributing factor,” EASA determined, adding that if not corrected, the condition could “lead in the worst-case scenario to an uncommanded elevator movement that may result in exceeding the aircraft’s structural capability.”

As such, Airbus issued the AOT, and the European regulator mandated the installation of a serviceable ELAC, prohibiting the installation of the affected computer. Operators had to make the change before the next flight after the effective date of the EAD, allowing non-Extended-range Twin-engine Operations Performance Standards (ETOPS) ferry flights with up to three flight cycles (FC) with no passengers to reach a potential maintenance location to complete the modification.

The effective date of the directive was 23:59 UTC on November 29, 2025.

Shortly after EASA’s directive, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) followed suit with its own EAD, warning that the “unsafe condition could lead to an uncommanded elevator movement that may result in exceeding the aircraft’s structural capability and consequent loss of continued safe flight and landing.” 

The FAA referred airlines to EASA’s emergency directive for compliance actions and deadlines.

Airlines around the world have addressed the issue, with some avoiding major flight disruptions in the past few days. For example, Wizz Air provided an operational update on December 1, stating that after it had received the EAD, its Engineering and Operations Control Center (OCC) teams “immediately initiated a comprehensive compliance programme to implement the required software amendments across the active fleet.”

After identifying 83 operational aircraft that were potentially affected by the directive, it had completed the mandated software change and had managed the situation “with zero flight cancellations.”

Flynas, a Saudi Arabia-based low-cost carrier, said that it had completed the updates for 20 out of 68 aircraft in its fleet “within a record time” without the issue affecting its operations.

Lufthansa – the airline, not the group – cautioned customers that while it had completed most of the software updates during Friday night and Saturday morning, which should result in no flight cancellations, “there may be minor delays over the weekend.”

Tony Fernandes, the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) of Capital A, the parent company of AirAsia, said in a post on LinkedIn that he received a call from Christian Scherer, the CEO of Airbus Commercial Aircraft, at around 22:00 local time (UTC +8) on November 28.

By 05:00 on November 29, AirAsia’s engineering teams had devised a solution, and between then and 07:00 on December 1, the teams had “downloaded and swapped out all the necessary control boxes across 96 aircraft.”

“They completed this incredible feat in just 25 hours,” Fernandes added, praising Scherer for personally calling him.

However, in the US, the issues had been exacerbated by winter storms that rolled through the Midwest, affecting major hubs such as Chicago O’Hare International Airport (ORD) during the last days of November. AccuWeather warned that the stormy weather “will continue into the first few days of December, as a new snowstorm takes shape and spans nearly two dozen states from Kansas to Maine.”

The safety event that resulted in the Airbus AOT and the emergency directives from regulators happened on JetBlue flight B6 1230, which was flying from Cancun International Airport (CUN) to Newark Liberty International Airport (EWR) on October 30.

According to Flightradar24 records, the A320ceo, registered as N605JB, operating the flight, experienced a sudden drop in altitude and diverted to Tampa International Airport (TPA). The aircraft stayed at TPA until November 3.

The French Bureau of Enquiry and Analysis for Civil Aviation Safety (Bureau d'enquêtes et d'analyses pour la sécurité de l'aviation civile, BEA) detailed that at cruise altitude of 35,000 feet (10,668 meters), the A320ceo “experienced an uncontrolled pitch down event for about 4-5 seconds before autopilot corrected,” likely occurring “during an ELAC switchover.”